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NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE PLURALITY OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63,
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
Catherine Baker Stetson*
Traditional North American tribal dispute settlement methods-
present a "legal system" which has, in modem times, been aug-
mented by the development of tribal court systems, each with
varying levels of law and custom. Imposed upon the confusing
juxtaposition of the two often-contradictory tribal systems are
the federal and state legal systems, which conflict not only with
each other but also, inevitably, with both tribal systems. It is not
urprising that numerous conflicts arise in adjudicating cases in
which tribes, states, and the federal government have an interest.
The conflicts arise out of basic differences in cultures, prior-
ities, and locale. They are aggravated by each group's desire to
control its own destiny and by its conviction that its particular
characteristics and needs are best known to the members of the
individual groups. For an Indian person who is simultaneously a
member of several groups and subgroups-from family and clan
to tribe, state, and nation-the conflicts are not often easily
resolved.
The Indian Child Welfare Act is a codification of a developing
compromise among the various legal systems. The federal fidu-
ciary, through the Act, has relinquished its interest, creating an
arena for state and tribal activity, provided that the two function
according to statutory guidelines. In doing so, the states ac-
knowledge certain tribal customs and interests in return for tribal
acceptance of certain state procedures and interference.
In order better to understand exactly how the Act works, it is
important to understand the relative positions of tribes and
states. For most of the period of their coexistence, it has been the
tribes that have been required to adapt, not the states. As they
have done so, however, the states have found themselves in an in-
creasingly less powerful position. Originally, the tribes were
forced to accept the new legal system imposed upon them by the
state and federal governments. Eventually, in response to the im-
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position, many tribes began to develop their own modern sys-
tems, modeled on non-Indian systems, but still incorporating, in
many instances, traditional tribal ways. Simultaneously, tribes
were developing in other areas as well, occasionally rendering
traditional ways less desirable, even unfeasible. Societal accep-
tance of the non-Indian legal systems slowly, and sometimes only
partially, led to psychological changes and acceptance on the part
of individual tribal members.
The changes in the tribal-state relationship have occurred in a
number of ways, some the product of mutual agreement. And the
changes have occurred on different levels, both within states and
within tribes. Stability, originally guaranteed by kinship solidarity
in tribes, became increasingly dependent upon legal procedures.
Nonetheless, tribal interest in custom and domestic relationships
continues to exist, and conflicts develop in many instances be-
cause of non-Indian ignorance of and lack of concern for Indian
priorities and beliefs. Progress has led to changes in the federal
and state legal systems, the result being a conscious desire to
recognize and work with traditional Indian cultures. Progress has
also served to allow tribes to develop tribal court systems that are
acceptable to and recognized by both Indians and non-Indians
alike. Of course, this has happened with varying degrees of suc-
cess, as each tribe has unique characteristics, needs, and abilities.
And because even these characteristics are changing, the respec-
tive legal systems, and their interrelation with other legal systems,
are changing. The Indian Child Welfare Act is a response to some
of these changes, within both Indian and non-Indian com-
munities, as new tensions and problems arise and are resolved.
Because of the presence of several different levels of
law-within each tribe, among tribes, and between tribes and
states-the conflicts that arise are frequent and often not easily
solved, if solvable at all. The process by which resolution occurs
also differs, depending upon which legal system or level is in-
volved. There are adoption and custody disputes between mem-
bers of the same tribe, between members of different tribes, and
between Indians and non-Indians; often resolution of the dispute
turns upon a determination of kinship, domicile, tribal member-
ship, or sovereign interest. The Indian Child Welfare Act at-
tempts to outline procedures for handling most of these prob-
lems, though it cannot be applied to all, and though it is unclear,
in many cases, exactly what the Act purports to do. Questions of
jurisdiction or choice of law are not always easily answered,
though the Act attempts to do so. Many questions will remain
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unanswered until litigation clarifies certain definitions, pro-
cedures, and intent. The Act, meanwhile, stands as a unique at-
tempt to codify the dynamics (procedural interaction) among the
several legal systems and levels, and as such may serve as an
analogous model for interactions in other areas of disputes, e.g.,
taxation, natural resource development, law enforcement, regula-
tion.
Multiplicity of Legal Systems
Analysis of any given law is frequently confined to discussions
of precedent, legislative history, and policy; and analysis of any
given legal system is frequently confined to discussions of its
laws. The shortcomings of such analyses are in their failure to
recognize and include the dynamics of subgroup laws and cus-
toms and of interdependent legal levels. Noted legal anthro-
pologist Leopold Pospisil, recognizing the inherent shortcomings
in traditional legal analyses, concluded "that any penetrating
analysis of law of a primitive or civilized society can be attained
only by relating it to the pertinent societal structure and legal
levels, and by a full recognition of the plurality of legal systems
within a society."'
Contemporary thought does not conceive of law as unique to
civilized societies; it does not treat law as an "autonomous in-
stitution," to be viewed apart from the cultural whole; nor does
it assume that law is unaffected by the political, social, cultural,
and economic forces within a society.2 Rather, the trend is to
view law as many-faceted, dependent not only upon legislation
but also upon custom and equity, functioning on different levels,
and interrelating with the laws and legal systems of the many
subgroups which invariably exist within a society. Such a concep-
tualization of law is especially useful in any analysis of laws that
affect tribal life in America, for the unique juxtaposition of legal
systems of tribal, state, and federal governments requires careful
consideration and understanding if analysis is to be useful at all.
The dispute over exactly what "law" is and where it can be
found has led to many theories about the relationship of law to
society, custom, and norms. Though, clearly, law cannot be
treated as if in a complete vacuum, some theorists would prefer
to downplay the effect of sociology on legal reasoning, in part
because of the increased number of factors that must then be
1. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAw 126 (1971) [hereinafter cited as POSPISIL].
2. Id. at ix-x.
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considered.' On the other hand, there are theorists who would
willingly consider various social factors as long as a distinction
were made between law, custom, and norm." Pospisil takes a
more integrative approach, distinguishing between customary
law-that which is internalized by a group and which signifies
proper behavior-and authoritarian law-that which has been
propounded by a strong minority group, which is considered to
represent the ideal, and which has not been internalized by the
group as a whole. The difference between the two depends purely
on the degree of internalization and, as such, is subject to change
as individuals and societies internalize or deinternalize any given
law. Thus, a law may originate either from the realm of custom
(as when the legal authority accepts custom as the basis of its
decisions) or from the realm of political or legal authority (at
which point society as a whole is obligated to comply, whether it
agrees or not).6
Traditional tribal law is for the most part customary law and is
an essential part of tribal life. "Every portion of it is equally
binding and has the same reputed origin; every portion equally
belongs to the traditions of the tribe and is a sacred inheritance
from the tribal ancestors. The law is a manifestation of the tribal
life, as indivisible as life itself."' Of course, such law is subject to
change as the result of contact with other societies or new en-
vironments, or as the result of internal tribal growth and develop-
ment.
Among tribal groups there are wide variations in the ways in
which disputes among members are handled, and in the ways in
3. 0. SAWER, LAW IN SocIErY 15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SAWER].
4. "Customs are norms or rules (more or less strict, and with greater or less support
of moral, ethical, or even physical coercion) about the ways in which people must behave
if social institutions are to perform their tasks and society is to endure. All institutions
(including legal institutions) develop customs. Some customs, in some societies, are re-
institutionalized at another level: they are restated for the more precise purposes of legal
institutions. When this happens, therefore, law may be regarded as a custom that has
been restated in order to make it amenable to the activities of the legal institutions. In this
sense, it is one of the most characteristic attributes of legal institutions that some of these
'laws' are about the legal institutions themselves, although most are about the other in-
stitutions of society-the familial, economic, political, ritual, or whatever." Bohannon,
The Differing Realms of the Law, at 35-36, in 67 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST #6, pt. 2
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Bohannon].
5. POSPISIL supra note 1, at 196-97.
6. Id. at 204-205. But see T. DAViTr, BASIC VALUES IN LAW 32 (1978) ("An unjust
law is no law.") [hereinafter cited as DAVIr].
7. E. HARTLAND, PRIMITIVE LAW 8 (1924) [hereinafter cited as HARTLAND].
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which third parties may intervene.8 To a degree, variations are at-
tributable to the type of society or government handling the dis-
pute. For example, as British legal anthropologist Simon Roberts
suggests:
Where centralized governments and adjudicatory processes of
dispute settlement are found, rules are likely to be clear-cut and
of crucial importance in decision-making, leaving little room
for the operation of extra-normative criteria. On the other
hand, in stateless societies where such settlement-directed talk-
ing as takes place is likely to be negotiatory, rules will be vague
and of limited importance in reaching an outcome, leaving
much greater play for pragmatic elements such as the physical,
political and economic strength of the disputants.'
The difficulty comes often as the result of a juxtaposition of
one or more of such legal systems, as differences in both pro-
cedural and substantive law, resulting from differences in needs,
structure, and perspective, inevitably give rise to conflict. Failure
to recognize the presence of the many and disparate legal systems
of the functioning subgroups of a given society can only result in
an inaccurate analysis and understanding of its legal dynamics.
Pospisil emphasizes the danger of considering law as unrelated to
social structure:
This multiplicity of legal systems, whose legal provisions
necessarily differ from one to another, sometimes even to the
point of contradiction, reflects precisely the pattern of the
subgroups of the society-what I have termed "societal struc-
ture" (structure of a society). Thus, according to the in-
clusiveness and types of the pertinent groups, legal systems can
be viewed as belonging to different legal levels that are
superimposed one upon the other, the system of a more in-
clusive group being applied to members of all its constituent
subgroups. As a consequence, an individual is usually exposed
to several legal systems simultaneously-to be exact, to as
many systems as there are subgroups of which he is a member.
This conception of society as a patterned mosaic structure of
subgroups with their specific legal systems and with a dynamic
center of power brings together phenomena and processes of a
basically legal nature that otherwise would be put into nonlegal
categories and treated as being qualitatively different.1"
8. S. ROBERTS, ORDER AND DispUTE 54-55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ROBERTS].
9. Id. at 175.
10. PosPisIL, supra note 1, at 125.
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Nowhere is such a concept better exemplified than in the rela-
tionship among federal, state, and tribal governments in the
United States, for here must be considered not only the interac-
tion of the state and federal authoritarian laws but also the in-
teraction of the tribal authoritarian laws (as manifested in tribal
codes) with tribal customary laws (occasionally, but not always,
considered by or consistent with the tribal codes). Though con-
flicts of laws between Indian and non-Indian systems have been
litigated extensively for nearly two hundred years, almost no con-
sideration at all has been given to the conflicts between and
within tribal systems. Because of the unique relationship between
the United States and the indigenous peoples within her boun-
daries, many issues arise that are not readily understood or
resolved without a clear perception of the origin and dynamics of
each of the legal levels and systems.
Conflicts Between Legal Levels and Legal Systems
A primary area of conflict is that between traditional tribal law
and codified law, be it tribal, state, or federal. This conflict has
frequently been overlooked, partly as the result of emphasis on
conflicts between the codes themselves and partly as the result of
nonacceptance of traditional ways as "law." Legal analysts have
been uniformly unwilling to deal with "laws" that are unwritten,
that perhaps exhibit no clear sanctions, and that are not exercised
within the framework of a legal institution, e.g., without courts,
judges, lawyers, and firm rules. Legal anthropologists have often
been hindered by similar prejudices as to the nature of "law,"
the result being polarization on the issue of whether so-called
primitive, traditional societies in fact are organized along any sort
of legal lines. The more recent and perhaps most realistic trend
has been to recognize custom as a part or form of law, not re-
quiring written regulations, institutional trappings, or physical
sanctions. The division of law into customary and authoritarian
law recognizes the importance and potency of custom as law
without requiring that custom be measured against the standards
and attributes of what is more commonly admitted to be "real
law." The absence of written regulations, judges, and courts does
not necessarily indicate that a society is lawless."
11. DAvrTr, supra note 6, at 34-36. "We can see without difficulty in primitive
societies what may well be the origins of legal systems; characteristic features of what we
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In the face of clear evidence that these [preliterate] groups
preserved order and had a concern for justice, [certain
researchers] continued to report that some societies of
preliterates were "lawless." Rather than question whether their
ideas of law were correct, they questioned whether these people
had any law.
To other anthropologists and ethnologists it seemed in-
congruous to hold that these societies which maintained order
and cared for justice were "lawless." It became obvious that
the command theory and the court theory of law had to give
way in the face of the facts. What became more and more evi-
dent was that these peoples had law. They themselves made law
in their custom regulations which related to their common
welfare. The essence of what was termed law in literate
societies was present in the custom law of preliterate people. 12
Custom law in traditional societies controls many areas of life,
including what we would call domestic relations; however, the
presence and functioning of kinship customs is largely unfamiliar
to members of a society that does not recognize clans or intricate
nonconsanguine relationships, or at least does not recognize such
concepts as being of primary significance. For those North
American tribes organized along kinship and clan lines, the essen-
tial functioning unit is the kin, of which the individual is but a
part. 3 This concept of relationship is vital in determining
numerous activities and behaviors, from marriage and instruction
to discipline and warring. Clan membership carries with it rights,
duties, responsibilities, and behaviorai attitudes which, in general
American culture, characterize relationships only between con-
sanguine family members, if then. The extended family and clan
relationships prevalent among traditional North American tribes
cannot be ignored or given secondary importance in dealing with
domestic relations between tribal members, and failure to
now regard as law are more apparent in the structure of rules and the way they are
discussed than in the institutions for the enforcement of those rules, but even on the in-
stitutional side there are not wanting practices and procedures which suggest later
developments. But perhaps the main importance of such studies is to show that relatively
complex social arrangements can be maintained for long periods without the institutions
which in modern society are regarded as necessary for a 'rule of law'." SAWER, supra
note 3, at 47.
12. DAvr,-r, supra note 6, at 41.
13. HARTLAND, supra note 7, at 48. See also PospIsIL, supra note 1, at 187-90 for an
insight into Hoebel's pioneering approach to law systems.
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recognize the significance and dynamics of such relationships can
only lead to difficulties in regulating and enforcing family laws.
The development of extended family and clan systems original-
ly guaranteed peace and order within a community.' 4 Coopera-
tion and solidarity between kinsmen were intricately regulated by
custom, inhibiting disputes and social disorders.'" Adoption
among many tribes in America occurred for religious, economic,
or social reasons, to perpetuate family lines, or to mitigate taboos
or financial hardship. 6 Necessarily, the concept of adoption and
foster care within a traditional tribal society differs from such a
concept in American society as a whole, where the concern is
primarily for the individual-specifically, the child-and not for
the extended family, clan, or tribe. Consideration of tribal and
family welfare as a whole may be recognized as an important fac-
tor by non-Indians but is not usually given much weight in
federal and state family courts exercising jurisdiction over place-
ment of Indian children.' 7
Because of the historical circumstances, there was no way to
avoid the juxtaposition of various legal systems in this country.
Frequently when one group is overpowered or conquered by
another group, the subordinated peoples are forced to accept,
and eventually assimilate, the systems of the dominant group.'8
In many cases, however, assimilation is unsuccessful, and the
generally smaller and more traditional or primitive group remains
a subgroup within the larger society while maintaining many of
its old customary laws in one form or another.' 9
Conflict arises not only when customary law is supplanted by
the laws of a conquering society but also when customary law is
supplanted, or at least augmented, by authoritarian law
developed within the subordinate subgroup. Such conflicts are ex-
emplified, with all the intricate inner workings, in this country's
14. HARTLAND, supra note 7, at 193-94.
15. ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 14.
16. See, e.g., HARTLAND, supra note 7, at 36; H. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH
AMERICA 226, 368 (1961).
17. See PosPIsIL, supra note 1, at 118-19 for other examples of similar conflicts.
18. HARTLAND, supra note 7, at 36-37.
19. "On the other hand this adherence to the customs and laws of their forefathers is
by no means absolute. Its appearance is deceptive to the people themselves. Cir-
cumstances are always, if slowly, changing, often so slowly that the people themselves are
unaware of the change; and the laws and customs necessarily change with the cir-
cumstances. When this is the case the old superseded practices are forgotten, and the fact
of the change, to say nothing of its details and direction, passes beyond recall." Id. at
202-203.
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relationships with its indigenous societies. There are the inevitable
and obvious conflict between the traditional tribal ways and the
superimposed government ways; and there are the more subtle
but equally problematic conflicts between traditional and modern
tribal ways. While the federal, state, and tribal governments and
courts litigate and quarrel over jurisdictional and substantive
issues, there are occurring many conflicts on lower legal levels
between traditionalists (who would adhere to the old customs and
rules) and the modernists (who would work within the framework
of the tribal systems modeled along federal guidelines). Conflict
is simultaneously intergroup and intragroup, then, and the
distinction is often difficult to make because of an individual's
concurrent membership in numerous subgroups.2 "
In a child custody proceeding, the dispute can be complicated
by the existence of distinct legal levels and systems. If a child is
the product of an intertribal marriage, just placement alone may
require looking into the custom of two clans, two tribes (and the
differences between the tribal customs of, for example, the Nava-
jo and the Santa Clara are rarely recognized, let alone understood
by nonmembers), as well as the tribal codes of both tribes; this in
addition to considering the individuated evidence of the par-
ticular fact situation and the possible conflict between two states'
codes. And that is only the beginning, since the federal laws must
also be contended with. It would be naive to suppose that con-
flicts of law will not arise at many, if not all, levels.
While the conflict between traditional and contemporary tribal
laws occurs, the more obvious and immediate struggle between
state and tribal laws dealing with the placement of Indian
children in foster and adoptive homes has in the past led to the
breakup of Indian families, serious adjustment problems for the
children involved, and a resultant loss of identity for such
children and, thus, for their tribes. As tribal governments and
courts grew in power and sophistication, they began to assert
more control over the placement and adoption of tribal children,
and developing precedent began to recognize the tribal interest in
such areas.21 Yet, in many instances, the state courts insisted
upon asserting jurisdiction over such matters, especially in cases
where domicile was not clear-cut or where one of the parents of a
child was not Indian.2"
20. ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 49-51.
21. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Wakefield v. Little
Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
22. See, e.g., In re Duryea, 115 Ariz. 86, 563 P.2d 885 (1977); In re Adoption of
19801
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"The difficulties in having placement and adoption proceedings
handled by state courts are obvious: misunderstanding, or com-
plete lack of understanding, of traditional tribal customs, prior-
ities, and behavior inevitably led welfare agencies, social workers,
and courts to make determinations that were damaging not only
to the children and families but also to the tribal systems. An in-
ordinate percentage of Indian children were removed from their
homes, and, to add insult to injury, they were usually placed in
non-Indian homes where adjustment and loss of cultural identity
compounded the problems.23
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was designed to counter
some of these problems, primarily by encouraging greater tribal
participation in the adjudication of child welfare and by specify-
ing standards and procedures for state courts which must still
deal with the issue of custody, placement, and adoption at one
point or another in the adjudication.24
Though the Act itself is not earthshaking in its specifications,
as it follows to a large degree the precedent established by deci-
sions such as Fisher v. District Court,25 Wakefield v. Little
Light,26 and Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston,' it is important
for its recognition of at least some of the intricacies and pitfalls
inherent in the coexistence of multiple legal systems and cultures,
as well as for the simple fact of its codification of the procedures
and considerations to be exercised by the various courts and
Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976); In re Greybull, 23 Or. App. 674, 543 P.2d 1079
(1975); In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972).
23. See Miles, Custody Provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The Ef-
fect on California Dependency Law, 12 U.C.D. 651-54 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Miles];
Limprecht, The Indian Child Welfare Act-Tribal Self-Determination through Participa-
tion in Child Custody Proceedings, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1202-1203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Limprecht]; Kirkwood, "The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Jurisdiction, Choice of
Law, and Recognition of Judgments" 1-2 (1979) (unpublished work in American Indian
Law Center Library) [hereinafter cited as Kirkwood].
24. Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 3. "The Congress hereby declares that it is the
policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the place-
ment of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child
and family service programs." 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978).
25. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
26. Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
27. Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
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agencies involved in child welfare proceedings. The process by
which both tribal and nontribal societies arrived at such a work-
ing relationship is an interesting example of the dynamics and
changes in legal systems, as the social and legal institutions re-
spond to changing needs and attitudes within their respective
groups.
As developments occur in the area of Indian child welfare, it
would be inaccurate to suppose that only the tribes and their
customs and laws have changed, for certainly the non-Indian
societies and their institutions have been forced, in one way or
another, to recognize and to accommodate the differences and
conflicts between the various cultures. The major changes, how-
ever, have been within the tribal communities, which have been
pressured by numbers, economics, and technologies to adapt to
alien concepts, procedures, and life-styles. Nonetheless, it should
be kept in mind that a discussion of changes in legal systems,
while analyzed here primarily in terms of changes as they affect
tribal peoples, is also applicable in many ways to the nontribal
systems. While the motivation for cooperation and resolution of
conflicts between systems may differ, the resulting relationships
are, of course, affected by the input of all concerned subgroups.
As noted earlier, the sources of law are varied, and a discussion
of the dynamics of a legal system is better informed if preceded
by a clear understanding of origins. Certainly, when two or more
legal systems are juxtaposed, ascertainment of their priorities and
of the source of their laws is mandatory if a resolution of the in-
evitable conflicts is to be effected.
Custom is the most obvious source of law, exemplified to some
degree by the common law as it -is accepted in England,2" and is
evident in the use of unwritten, though often mentioned, tradi-
tion in many tribal courts. 29 Legislation and codification are
sources of law which specify what will be considered proper or
deviant conduct in the future. Though in many cases such law
derives in part from custom (which amalgamates past experi-
ences), codification is basically authoritarian law that is made in
aspiration of developing an ideal society.3"
Another major source of law is, of course, equity, which seems
to have developed to fill the gaps and plug the loopholes created
28. H. EHRMIANN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL CuLTUREs 21-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
EHRMANNI.
29. HARTLAND, supra note 7, at 214.
30. EMa IANN, supra note 28, at 24-29.
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by codification of the ideal. 3 In a way, custom can be seen as
embodying what we have been and to some degree what we are
today; authoritarian law embodies to some degree what we are
today and where we plan to move if all goes as it should; equity is
the embodiment of the recognition that all does not always go as it
should, and equity is the compromise source of law which deals
with the realities of where we actually are today, taking into con-
sideration the errors of our past and the ideals for our future.,2
That legal organization responds to cultural," social,34 and
economic stimuli" is not a newly discovered or particularly sur-
prising fact. An interesting phenomenon occurs, however, when
conquest by one group does not destroy the cultural, economic,
and legal organizations of the subordinated group. In this case, a
new legal level is created for both groups, and the resultant unify-
ing system attempts, somehoiv, to reconcile the many differences
of both systems. The changes in this case are originally effected,
not by mutual agreement or gradual assimilation (though both
are to some degree required if a functioning coexistence of legal
systems is to occur),36 but in response to the inevitable tensions
that "develop because legal relation fails to correspond with
social relation. ' '37
To bring about changes in the law it is generally necessary that
social and political pressures be built up, and even after this
appears to have been done the pressures can be deflected or ar-
rested unless they are strong and specific enough.
In times of real and perceived emergencies, of major tech-
nological breakthroughs, of social catastrophes and widespread
indignation, law will make the jump that enables it to confirm
or even accelerate social change.3
31. Id. at 29-31.
32. "[Tjhe relative importance given to these sources by the various legal families, or
indeed by different members of the same family, varies strikingly. While in general
cultural differences have been decisive for such preferences, historical situations, stability
or upheaval, slow economic mutations, or a technological breakthrough may impose the
use of one source rather than another. Throughout history each of these sources has had
its ideological defenders who were inclined to see the virtues of wisdom and justice
restricted to those sources that seemed to serve best their own interests and values." Id. at
21.
33. See, e.g., POSPISIL. supra note I, at 139-43 for Savigny's use of cultural factors.
34. See, e.g., id. at 130-38 for Montesquieu's use of social factors.
35. See, e.g., id. at 153-66 for Marx's and Engels's theories of law and economics.
36. Id. at 121-22.
37. SAWER, supra note 3, at 169.
38. EHRMANN, supra note 28, at 4.
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Though all of the involved groups are required to confront the
issues that accompany changes, it is the tribal group that has the
greatest difficulty and faces the greatest change. The nontribal
groups, nonetheless, are faced with potential waste of social
resources and possible reactionism if they are not flexible and
perceptive enough to recognize the problems and to work to mini-
mize them.
Though there is no possibility of the federal and state govern-
ments in this country reverting to customary law, or allowing
tribes to revert to their respective customary laws, still, an
enlightened and sincere consideration of such laws, their origins,
their functions, and their utility is necessary to legislative and
judicial determinations vis h vis the tribes. The infinite number of
questions which could be asked and then answered have been the
concern of many lawmakers in the past. Cardozo in particular
acknowledged the dilemma when he wrote:
To what sources of information do I appeal for guidance? To
what proportion do I permit them to contribute to the result?
In what proportion ought they to contribute? If a precedent is
applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is ap-
plicable, how do I reach the rule which will make a precedent
for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the sym-
metry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what
point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by
some consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the
common standards of justice and morals?39
The respected anthropologist Paul Bohannon, in describing the
realms of law, discussed the effects of multiple legal cultures
within a legal system, noting a basic difference between those
systems that are unified under a central and single power (one
sovereign) and those that function under multicentric powers
(multiple sovereigns, e.g., federal and state, state and tribal).
Bohannon's analysis termed the first a colonial law system and
the latter an international law system. The colonial law system is
characterized by "a systematic misunderstanding between the two
cultures within the single power system, with constant revolution-
ary proclivities resulting from what is, at best, a 'working mis-
understanding.' "10 The major problem with this organization is
that disparate goals and procedures lead to what seem to be ar-
39. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921/1971).
40. Bohannon, supra note 4, at 39.
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bitrary legal results, and the resultant lack of consensus about
such results inevitably leads to disagreements about the validity
and fairness of the system. This is the situation today in this
country, certainly with respect to tribal status; the majority lack
of concern and understanding for tribal ways has resulted in
tribal dissatisfaction with and scorn of the majority rules, and has
caused antagonisms that have resulted in loss of time, money,
and even lives.
Bohannon's conceptualization of the international law system
would attempt to reconcile the differences between two or more
interrelated systems, though a successful working solution has
not yet been institutionalized.- Nonetheless, in a society that has
allowed, at times even encouraged, conflicting tribal systems to
remain and to become self-determinant, the development of a
system based on the international law concept would be useful in
eliminating wasteful struggles between subgroup power systems.
Further, development of such a legal mode would have a desira-
ble cohesive (as opposed to assimilative) effect because members
of subgroups would be more inclined to accept resultant laws as
just and thus binding upon their behavior. One cannot realistical-
ly expect compliance with laws that are not respected and that do
not take into consideration basic major priorities.
The problem of multiple legal systems and levels cannot be
solved through legislative and judicial channels alone, even if the
developing laws, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act, are con-
siderably more enlightened and cognizant of subgroup traditions.
New laws must be internalized on both an individual and institu-
tional level if they are to be accepted as customary. Compliance
with a law is only the first step toward internalization, for an in-
dividual may comply with a law, not from any sense that it is
fair, but from the fear of punishment. The second step is iden-
tification with or sincere acceptance of a rule, which stems from a
desire to participate as a member in the social group responsible
for propounding the rule. Internalization, the final step, is the
result of an individual's acceptance of the rule "because he finds
its content intrinsically rewarding." 4 Members of both groups
must individually go through these stages before new laws can be
said to be truly internalized. (Societal internalization is less con-
41. Id. at 41. See also Cohn, Anthropological Notes on Dispute and Law in India, in
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, supra note 4, at 109-11; EHRMANN, supra note 28, at 124-25
for attempts made in India, Africa, Japan, and Israel.
42. POSPISIL, supra note 1, at 201.
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cerned with the psychological reactions to a given law; rather,
once a number of individuals personally internalize a law, the
societal internalization has occurred, and the law is supported as
customary.)43 Now, though many tribes do not necessarily accept
all of the federal or state laws that bind them, they may accept as
customary and just the laws established by their own tribal coun-
cils and courts; in such instances, though these councils and
courts were once alien to the tribes, their existence has been
socially internalized. Within some tribes, still, there are large
numbers of people who have not internalized even their own tri-
bal codes (products, after all, of a non-Indian mentality), though
tribal codes are probably deferred to with greater frequency and
less complaint than federal and state codes.
The Indian Child Welfare Act can be seen in many ways as a
small attempt by the conflicting legal systems in this country to
respond to numerous pressures and problems. While the tribal
court systems are interested primarily in the protection of tribal
resources (children) and the exercise of tribal sovereignty, the
states are interested in preserving the rights of their non-Indian
members (voters) and in maintaining jurisdiction over their ter-
ritory. The federal government, as fiduciary to the tribes, is com-
mitted to a national policy of self-determination for tribes, while
economically, politically, and otherwise it is committed to
democratic ideals that place great emphasis on the welfare and
desires of the majority-in this case, certainly not the tribes. The
Indian Child Welfare Act is something of a compromise between
the tribal and state courts, which are constantly warring over
jurisdiction. It explicitly defines areas of jurisdiction, recognizing
officially that the tribes have a compelling interest in the deter-
mination of the welfare of their members, including children, and
that the tribes in many, if not most, instances are better able to
handle the intricate domestic and religious relationships which do
not have parallels in nontribal societies." Such a law, by taking
into account numerous factors of substantive and procedural law
of both tribal and state systems, is more likely to be internalized,
thus respected and followed, by members of all involved groups.
Despite several shortcomings and potential problems, the Indian
Child Welfare Act is a useful example of how a conflict of laws,
resulting from a multiplicity of cultures, legal systems, and levels,
may be resolved.
43. Id. at 204-206.
44. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5), 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1978).
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The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
Prior to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act, tribes
had several difficulties in exercising their interest and control over
child custody proceedings. Not only did they continually have to
fight to assert jurisdiction but also, even when such jurisdiction
was established, tribes often had trouble enforcing the decisions
of their courts because of the lack of full faith and credit attached to
such decisions.
On the question of jurisdiction, state court rulings were con-
fusing and often diametrically opposed to one another. After
Fisher," it was clear that tribes had exclusive jurisdiction when
both parents and child were domiciled on the reservation. How-
ever, such an ideal fact situation does not always present itself,
and off-reservation contacts frequently served as the basis for
assumption of jurisdiction by state courts."' On the other hand,
some states refused to take jurisdiction if a tribal court already
had become involved in a dispute, even if the off-reservation con-
.tacts were many. 7 The unpredictability of jurisdictional assump-
tion led to confusion and dissatisfaction among all parties con-
cerned. 41
Even in cases in which tribal courts did receive jurisdiction
over proceedings, their decisions were not-often:ses d r en-
forced. Though many states applied th dctrine of comi. with
respect to tribal court decisions prior to -The t,-only' Wash-
ington 49 and New Mexico"0 applied full faith and credit to such
judgments. Several states explicitly rejected the application of full
faith and credit to tribal law." Although the court in Arizona did
apply comity, it did not feel an obligation to recognize the validi-
ty of tribal court decrees, thus increasing the uncertainty inherent
in child custody proceedings and allowing for state manipulation
of laws and events to satisfy its own ends in the name of public
45. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
46. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
47. Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (V.D. Mich. 1973);
Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 649,
555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
48. Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 4-10.
49. In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976).
50. Jim v. CIT, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
51. Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977); Begay
v. Miller, 70 Adiz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950); Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D.
1977); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. App. 1975).
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policy.2 Because application of comity does not require that
deference be paid to tribal judgments, prior to the Act most
states were able to find some way in which to weaken or even
nullify tribal law, assuming even that the tribe had been suc-
cessful in its acquisition of jurisdiction. 3
The effect of such state control had, and continues to have,
negative effects on tribes whose incentive to enter into reciprocal
agreements with states is lessened because of the fear of increased
state control over tribal affairs. It also lessens states' incentives to
do likewise unless there is a potential benefit to the state, as most
tribes do not have significant leverage.
The implications of this lack of governmental interaction are
significant. In the absence of mutuality, injustices for tribes
and tribal members are common. Tribal members are often un-
able to enforce contract rights or other civil remedies which in-
volve parties off the reservation. . . . Obviously, lack of
cooperation encourages violators on both sides. More impor-
tantly, the result is the extension of existing antagonisms."
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides something of a solution
to these problems of jurisdiction and full faith and credit by
specifying exclusive jurisdiction where a child is domiciled on-
reservation," by allowing for reassumption of tribal jurisdiction
over custody matters in Public Law 280 states, 6 by requiring
transfer from state courts to tribal courts (absent good cause or
certain objections)," by allowing tribal right of intervention in
those cases that remain in state courts, 8 and by entitling full faith
and credit to tribal actions in child custody proceedings. 9 As a
result, tribal courts have both the jurisdiction and the ability to
enforce their judgments in such proceedings, ostensibly, if not in
fact.60
Though there are still numerous problems in implementing the
52. Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 13. See generally Ragsdale, Problems in the Ap-
plication of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977).
53. Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1123,
1136-38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jones].
54. Issues in Mutuality, AM. INDIAN LAWYERS TRAINING PROGRAM, INC.. 3-4 (1976).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1918.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).
60. But see Jones, supra note 3, at 1145.
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Act,' it is useful in its explicit delineation of jurisdiction and
procedures, as well as in its recognition of tribal customs as a
function of the law 2.6  Basically, tribal jurisdiction is now ex-
clusive in child custody proceedings where the child has residence
or domicile on the reservation or when the child is a ward of the
tribal court.63 In other cases, a state is required to transfer the ac-
tion to the appropriate tribal court unless one or both parents ob-
ject or there is good cause why transfer should not occur. Either
parent, custodian, or tribe may petition for such a transfer.6 4
Further, both custodian and tribe have the right to intervene in
any state court proceeding for foster care placement or for ter-
mination of parental rights.65
In the fact situation of In re Doe, pre-Act, the grandfather
who petitioned for custody of his daughter's child was denied
custody by the state court "in the best interests of the child." ' 66
Although the court noted the presence of tribal interest in the ad-judication, its decision was predicated on factors testified to by
61. Appointment of legal counsel is a problem area, for the Act does not specify
when this is to occur or who is to pay for such services. Neither does it specify whether
appointment may be waived or whether it is mandatory.
Emergency removal of Indian children provides another loophole for state placement
without notice or other safeguards. The procedure is further complicated by a failure of
the Act to specify who pays for the placement and who provides and pays for transporta-
tion of the child when he is finally returned to his home.
There are many other minor problems attendant upon the Act. Who can make de-
mand for the return of a child, and when? Can a tribal court subpoena non-Indian ex-
perts and witnesses to testify, and who pays for their appearance? Where should records
be maintained, who can request them, and how are independent adoption records to be
handled? Is another hearing required before changing foster home placements; if so, who
must be notified?
In many cases, jurisdiction will remain in state courts while tribes undergo the
lengthy-process of retrocession. In adoption proceedings, there is no right of tribal in-
tervention, even though such participation is more likely to ensure better placement. The
lack of funding for family programs and subsidized adoptions has, of course, hindered
implementation of these policies. See generally, Miles, supra note 23, at 664; Barsh, "The
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and Why It Will Fail" (unpublished work in American
Indian Law Center Library) (hereinafter referred to as Barsh); Marousek, The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Provisions and Policy, 25 S.D. L. REv. 98 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Marousek].
62. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2), 25 U.S.C. § 1903(12).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). The Act also provided for notice to be given (§ 1912(a)), for
counsel to be appointed (§ 1912(b)), for examination of records (§ 1912(c)), for proof of
the failure of remedial services and efforts (§ 1912(d)), and for evidentiary standards for
both foster care placement and termination of parental rights (§§ 1912(e), 1912(t)).
66. In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976).
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social workers, e.g., the child's slow development, the grand-
father's age and employment, the child's domicile in Gallup.
There was not much weight given to the tribal customs or abilities
to fulfill the child's cultural, religious, and social needs. Post-
Act, the grandfather, as a custodian, could petition the court for
transfer to the Navajo Tribal Court, providing that the parents
did not object. Once such transfer was effected, the tribal court
would be better informed as to how to settle the custody battle.
Even if one of the parents did object to the transfer, both the
tribe and the grandfather would have the right to intervene in the
state court proceedings to present their unique testimony and
evidence as to the disposition. Furthermore, placement prefer-
ence, by statute, would have been given to the grandfather or
other member of the child's extended family, and prevailing
Navajo community standards would have to be followed in ulti-
mately determining placement.
When a parent voluntarily consents to a termination of rights,
the Act requires that specific procedures be followed and that cer-
tification be given by the court that the parent fully understands
the consequences, which must be explained in language the parent
understands. 67 Consent to foster care placement may be with-
drawn by a parent or custodian at any time, 68 and even voluntary
termination of parental rights may be withdrawn at any time
before a final decree of termination or adoption is entered. 69
Violation of such provisions may result in the invalidation of
placement or parental right termination." °
As mentioned, placement of children in foster or adoptive
homes requires that preference be given to specified tribal mem-
bers and families or to appropriate homes approved by the tribe, 1
and the standards to be applied are those of the Indian communi-
ty.72" Improper removal of a child by a petitioner in state court
will result in the return of the child to the parent or custodian,
and the state court is obligated to decline jurisdiction over the
petition.73
Provision is made for emergency removal or .placement by the
state of an Indian child living off-reservation in order to prevent
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d).
71. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a), 1915(b), 1915(c).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 1920.
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imminent physical damage or harm to the child, but said removal
terminates when it is no longer necessary. At that point, the state
court must initiate proceedings in keeping with the Act to trans-
fer jurisdiction to the tribal court or to return the child to its
parents or custodian.74 The remainder of the Act deals with fund-
ing and recordkeeping."1
These specifications and requirements give effect to tribal
customs and authority to a degree that has not previously oc-
curred in tribal-state relations. The Indian Child Welfare Act
codifies federal recognition of the utility and validity of tribal
legal systems and laws, both customary and legislative, but prob-
lems in interpretation and implementation remain.
Major constitutional issues continue to confront individuals
and courts in their dealings under the Act. The jurisdictional pro-
visions are subject to challenge on the basis of an equal protec-
tion argument, and both jurisdictional and procedural provisions
are subject to challenge by states' rights arguments.76
The tenth amendment gives states certain reserved powers,77
one of which seems to be the right to regulate domestic relations
and state court procedures within state boundaries." Congres-
sional power over Indian affairs prevents states from infringing
upon essential tribal relations, at least those occurring on-
reservation.79 The Indian Child Welfare Act, in establishing tribal
jurisdiction over Indians off-reservation and in imposing pro-
cedural guidelines, clearly affects the states' reserved powers,
though the Indian commerce clause,"0 the Bill of Rights," and the
supremacy clause 2 appear to allow this infringement in the in-
terests of tribal sovereignty and self-determination. 3 None-
theless, many states are bound to disapprove of this removal of
state power and, even if they avoid a direct challenge to the Act,
may decide to take advantage of the various ambiguities and
loopholes in the Act in order to retain state control.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1922.
75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1931-63.
76. Marousek, supra note 1, at 101.
77. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
78. Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (state has no power over
domestic affairs between Indians on-reservation).
80. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8 cl. 3.
81. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
82. U.S. CoNsr. amend. X.
83. Marousek, supra note 1, at 105-107.
[Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/5
NOTES
The fifth amendment presents another problem, as it prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race.8 ' Though classification of a
child as Indian for purposes of the Act can be seen as racial
discrimination, that argument is not likely to prevail as the
Supreme Court has already addressed the issue on several occa-
sions, notably Morton v. Mancari.85 A better argument could be
made that equal protection of Indian children is violated by deny-
ing them the benefits of state court. Aside from the distinct
unlikelihood that such benefits do in fact exist for Indian
children, the Supreme Court has indicated that the "disparate
treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to
benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the Con-
gressional policy of Indian self-government." 86 Another equal
protection issue is raised concerning the different rights of Indian
and non-Indian custodians. This problem remains to be resolved
in litigation and will probably be subject to varying interpreta-
tions, depending on the individual fact situations.
Assuming that the issues of constitutionality do not prevent the
implementation of the Act, recognition and enforcement of tribal
decisions will present other hurdles for tribes. Since 1855, federal
courts have held that full faith and credit is to be applied to tribal
court judgments,87 but later state court decisions held otherwise.
Though Washington and New Mexico have once again recognized
full faith and credit, other states have hesitated, often preferring
instead to exercise comity, which does not compel enforcement of
tribal decrees. The full faith and credit clause of the Act requires
all states to give full faith and credit "to the extent that such en-
tities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any other entity." 88 By specifying
"entity" instead of "state," the Act leaves open many possi-
bilities for states to apply comity and not full faith and credit to
the proceedings of other entities, or which may decline even to
exercise comity, in the absence of reciprocal agreements.89 Also,
the failure to require reciprocity may seem inconsequential con-
sidering that the major problem has always been in getting state
84. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (fifth amendment due process
- fourteenth amendment equal protection).
85. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
86. Marousek, supra note 61, at 106.
87. Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F.721 (1897); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (1894);
Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
88. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).
89. See Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 23; Barsh, supra note 61, at 9-16.
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courts to recognize tribal decrees, and not vice versa. However,
failure to specify reciprocity is inconsistent with the traditional
notions of full faith and credit and leaves potentially nasty issues
about the requirement of tribal courts to enforce state
judgments.90
Major difficulties in applying the Act stem from questionable
or vague definitions and terminology. The Act establishes tribal
jurisdiction and priority in child custody proceedings, 9 but:
The Act does not cover placements in divorce proceedings, or
placements based on acts that, "if committed by an adult,
would be deemed a crime": that is, placements after an ad-
judication of delinquency. It does, however, cover placements
related to status offenses such as truancy, running away, or
curfew violations.92
Neither does it apply to proceedings which determine neglect or
abuse or the need for in-home supervision. Thus, state in-
terference continues to be permitted under the Act, though it may
very well cause psychological damage to the family, resulting in
pressures and problems for those whom the Act was intending to
benefit." In many areas, such as informal dispositions and exten-
sions of orders, state law may continue to conflict with Act
guidelines because state procedures frequently do not have pro-
cedural correlates in the Act. 4
Though the Act specifies transfer to tribal court in many cir-
cumstances, state interference is not limited to informal disposi-
tions; when the state courts do retain jurisdiction, concurrent or
otherwise, they are not required to apply tribal law, either
customary or authoritarian. They are constrained by the require-
ment that they apply "the prevailing social and cultural standards
of the Indian community" ' but the substantive law is state law.96
Undoubtedly, the choice of laws under such circumstances almost
90. Also, full faith and credit is never required if the first court lacked jurisdiction.
Since subject-matter jurisdiction in custody cases is based on domicile, a determination
that is flexible and confusing, state courts may very well use this as a loophole to escape
the full faith and credit requirement. See Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 24.
91. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (Supp. 1979).
92. Marousek, supra note 61, at 102.
93. See Miles, supra note 23, at 666-67; Limprecht, supra note 23, at 1218-19.
94. Limprecht, supra note 23 at 1226.
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
96. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(b), 1912(c), 1912(d), 1913(b), 1914, 1915(a),
1915(e), 1916(a), 1921, 1922.
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has to be that of the forum state, as the difficulties in having state
courts apply tribal law are mind-boggling, as can be imagined.
Still, the dichotomy of having state courts apply state laws to
tribal relationships encourages misuse and is further confused by
section 1921, which provides for the application of higher stan-
dards of protection in the event that state law conflicts with Act
guidelines. Ironically, the result is inadequate in that essentially it
asks state courts to compare their laws with the Act's provisions
and then to apply whichever the state court happens to feel is
superior. 97 In many of the nebulous areas, decisions will turn ex-
clusively on state officials' arbitrary tendencies to interpret the
Act liberally or restrictively, as is their wont. 9s
Vagueness in definitions runs throughout the Act. For exam-
ple, in defining an Indian child, the Act excludes all children who
are not eligible for enrollment in a tribe, 99 even if the child's
biological parents are enrolled tribal members. Blood quantum
requirements vary from tribe to tribe and were originally
established merely as a basis to determine service responsibilities
of the federal government; in the context of the Act, however,
they serve to deny tribes domestic control over many children
who are, for most other intents and purposes, Indian,' Further-
more, children of many Alaskan natives are not qualified as "In-
dian children" under the Act. 10 1 This leads to the incongruous
result that many children of Alaskan natives, born after 1971,
will not be considered Indian for the purpose of the Act until
their grandparents die. Once the parents then inherit the "village
shares," the children magically "become" Indian, though the
metamorphosis may be too late to prevent their unjust place-
ment.'02
Further ambiguities arise in trying to determine who are ex-
tended family members, as custom on this issue varies from tribe
to tribe, and often differs from the law. As most tribes do not
have official publications of their customs, state officials have
great difficulty in applying those provisions of the Act which
specify extended family members as interested parties. Also,
membership requirements of each tribe are not presently available
97. Barsh, supra note 61, at 23.
98. Limprecht, supra note 23, at 1226.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1903.
100. Barsh, supra note 61, at 5.
101. Id. at 6-7.
102. The Act does not consider children of terminated tribes to be "Indian children"
for the purposes of the Act, even if their parents are fullbloods.
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to state officials who often have to adjudicate issues dealing with
membership. Though membership criteria are often spelled out in
tribal constitutions, unwritten criteria are still the basis for many
tribal determinations of membership.' 3
Consideration of these and other tribal standards are extremely
important in the development and function of a legal system, but
it is quite difficult to identify and give proper priority to these
factors for judicial consideration. Vagueness and flexibility can
be manipulated by state courts to their own ends. The difficulty is
exaggerated for those officials who are unfamiliar with tribal and
intertribal issues. The Act is silent on resolution of intertribal
conflicts, for example, in the area of jurisdiction. Strict construc-
tion would assert jurisdiction in the tribe with which the child
resides; purposive analysis would find jurisdiction in the tribe of
which the child is a member. Though the Act was intended to in-
crease tribal jurisdiction, it may be appropriate that it does not
specify guidelines for solving intertribal conflicts, preferring in-
Atead to let the tribes involved work it out between themselves.'"4
Nevertheless, if a child is a member or potential member of more
than one tribe, the Act treats the child as a member of the tribe
with which it has the most significant contacts. Notification of in-
tent to seek custody is required then only to be sent to one tribe,
despite the fact that the child, its parents, or its other tribe may
have vital interests in the adjudication. Though the notified tribe
might decline to intervene and the unnotified tribe might be in-
terested in intervention, the petitioner for custody is able to
satisfy the Act's requirements without any further tribal input,'10
since the Act requires only that one tribe be notified.' 6 This may
seem insignificant, but when faced with the large number of in-
tertribal marriages and offspring, it appears increasingly impor-
tant that both tribes be identified. 0 7
103. See, e.g., Note, Tribal Sovereignty: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal
Sovereignty 146 Years Later, 8 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 139 1980).
104. Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 20.
105. Barsh, supra note 61, at 12.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Further state power is given in cases of the Pub. L. 280 states. Though the Act
allows for the transfer of a custody proceeding involving children residing off-reservation,
it does not appear to allow for the transfer of proceedings for those children residing on-
reservation if the reservation is in a Pub. L. 280 state, and if the child is a member of
another tribe. This is a further example of the difficulties in intertribal membership. By
determining which tribe a petitioning party wishes to give notice to, that party effectively
selects the tribe eligible to accept transfer, and conceivably this could result in a species of
forum shopping, as a petitioner may (with varying degrees of difficulty) prefer to notify
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Notice itself presents several problems, from trying to figure
out who is a tribe's designated agent for service to locating and
identifying the child's custodian and tribe. 108 The Act is unclear
about what to do when the parent or custodian and the tribe can-
not be determined. It specifically allows for the notification of
the Secretary of the Interior if neither the parent or custodian nor
the tribe can be identified, but it does not seem to require such
notification if only one of the parties is unidentifiable; yet the
state court cannot proceed unless both have received notice. Once
the secretary is notified, he is allowed fifteen days to notify both
parent or custodian or tribe, but if he falls to do so in a timely
manner, there is no provision for recourse should the time
allowable for intervention pass."0 9 Because of the inconsistencies
and questions arising on the issue of notice, the simplest thing for
states to do is routinely to notify the secretary, thus avoiding all
confusing contact with tribes, tribal parents, and guardians.
This problem will encourage state agencies to avoid parents
and tribes altogether and routinely send notice directly to the
Secretary. Besides being simpler and faster, notifying the Secre-
tary almost guarantees parents' and tribes' non-participation in
the court proceedings. The Secretary has fifteen days to at-
tempt to notify the parents and the tribe, but the state court
can proceed after only ten days. Indeed, the child could be
placed or adopted before the Secretary's time to notify the
parents and tribe has expired."'
Once notice has been given directly to a tribe, the tribe may
decline to have the custody proceeding transferred, if the tribe
can figure out the procedure for such a declination. It is unclear
from the Act whether failure to answer is itself sufficient or
whether the response must be oral or written.
Transfer can be prevented if a parent objects to it (unless the
child is domiciled on-reservation), if no parental rights are being
severed, or if the state finds "good cause" not to transfer."'
that tribe he feels would be less interested in becoming involved in the custody issue. (See
Barsh, supra note 61, at 15-16). The transfer right is not automatic and must be preceded
by a timely request for such a transfer, thus limiting the right of intervention, as it is ap-
parently in the judge's discretion as to what "timely" means.
108. Miles, supra note 23, at 667.
109. Barsh, supra note 61, at 13-14.
110. Id. at 14.
111. Jones, supra note 53, at 1139. Even if the parents don't agree to transfer, it is
not clear from the Act who is to prevail. Legislative history suggests that the parent who
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"Good cause" as discussed in the legislative history seems to
mean forum non conveniens, but even if so limited, which is
arguable, there are enough factors that may be considered in a
determination of "good cause" as to make it a useful tool for
those state forums which are reluctant to transfer proceedings in-
to tribal court.112 The ironic result is that the Act, which has as
one of its purposes to remove the destiny of Indian children from
the hands of state judges who have been notoriously incapable of
recognizing the relevant cultural standards of tribal people,
specifies that the remedy of transfer be at the discretion of these
very judges."I3
Placement preferences are also subject to "good cause" excep-
tions and may easily result in placement of Indian children in
non-Indian homes. Additionally, preference of the parent or
child will only be considered "where appropriate," which means,
for example, that if a single parent requests placement of the
child with a non-Indian family, the tribe would not even be enti-
tled to notice." 4 Invalidation of the placement is allowed spec-
ifically for violations of the notice and transfer provisions, but
the Act does not specify what happens if certain other provisions,
such as placement preferences, are violated." 5
A parent's desire for anonymity may also be used to place In-
dian children with non-Indian families, for in this instance the
court would not be compelled to reveal familial or tribal affilia-
tion, thus substantially reducing the child's chances of being
placed in an Indian home." 6
In order to limit the removal of Indian children from their
homes, the Indian Child Welfare Act has established standards of
proof and procedures which must be met. Realistically, however,
the quality of expert testimony weighs more heavily than the
objects to transfer wins, at least as against the tribe, though not necessarily as against the
other parent or guardian. There is also sentiment to the effect that the parent requesting
transfer should be favored. (See Kirkwood, supra note 23, at 21.) The question gains in
complexity when one of the parents is non-Indian, and 'when the parents are from two
different tribes, only one of which, of course, will receive notice and the option to exer-
cise jurisdiction.
112. Id. at 1142-44.
113. Barsh, supra note 61, at 17, 28.
114. Jones, supra note 53, at 111.
115. Barsh, supra note 61, at 21. Also, to invalidate a placement for lack of notice, it
must be proven not only that the child in question is Indian but also that the state court
knew, or had reason to know, of that fact. This sort of loophole seriously jeopardizes
tribal ability to enforce its control and exercise its interest.
116. Jones, supra note 53, at 111.
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quantum of proof. ' 7 Because there is no definition of "expert"
in this context, and because the Act does not require the tes-
timony of tribal members and professionals, the end result will be
that many state courts will listen to the same individuals and
agencies who were testifying in custody proceedings prior to the
Act.
Finally, before removal of an Indian child from his home, the
Act requires a showing that sincere efforts have been made to im-
prove the family situation. Of course, a determination of what is
adequate may differ from county to county, state to state, and in
the end the responsibility of making the important decision is left
in the hands of the state courts."'
Conclusion
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, while in some ways
merely a codification of state and federal judicial law, is a signifi-
cant step toward realizing the conflicts inherent in a legal system
that is actually a conglomeration of legal systems, each with its
own sovereign and legal level. The Act is important for its at-
tempt at resolving certain of these conflicts by specifying jurisdic-
tion and procedures, and could perhaps be useful as a model for
future legislation dealing with the interaction of states and tribes.
It is unique in its recognition of major cultural differences be-
tween tribal people and the American society as a whole.
A number of other solutions could have been arrived at, for
the Act could have specified that Indian child custody pro-
ceedings be placed in any one of three judicial forums: federal,
state, or tribal. And the choice of law could have been exclusively
federal, state, or tribal. Such an exclusive remedy would be un-
realistic and unfair, given the interests of all three governments in
the final adjudication of domestic rights. The Act as it stands
preempts certain states' rights in favor of tribal self-deter-
mination, striking a compromise without running into serious
constitutional issues. Moreover, although it could have specified
the application of tribal law by state courts in such of the pro-
ceedings as they have jurisdiction over, the result would have led
to insurmountable problems as state court judges attempted to
deal with the very issues which the Act presupposes they are in-
capable of understanding and handling. Thus, the dual jurisdic-
tion of state and tribal courts, each applying their own laws, ap-
117. Barsh, supra note 61, at 19.
118. Id. at4.
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pears to be the most workable of solutions from a practical
standpoint.The solution is not without a multitude of shortcomings, how-
ever, which stem largely from a failure to address certain major
conflicts and from a failure to define various key terms and con-
cepts. It is difficult to be specific in writing a law that must en-
compass all tribes and all states, for the individual needs and
abilities of each vary considerably, and there is also the danger of
becoming too specific, thereby destroying the flexibility that is
necessary in dealing with individualized fact situations.
Nonetheless, as it is currently enacted, the Act will not
necessarily function as much of a deterrent to those states that
wish, for one reason or another, to retain jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings. The ambiguities, the numerous loop-
holes, the wide discretion left to state court judges, all work to
the advantage of any state court with a desire to employ them.
The expectation is that state courts will be willing to comply with
the spirit and intent of the Act; this can be encouraged by strong
tribal agencies and serious tribal court participation in custody
and placement proceedings. If both tribes and states work togeth-
er in administration pursuant to the Act, it is possible that the
final result will be the implementation of a miniature version of
Bohannon's international law system whereby conflicting sover-
eign powers function together to produce an equitable and
respected result. As provisions and terminology of the Act are
litigated, and precedent begins to be established by way of addi-
tional guidelines for states and tribes, this result will perhaps be
more apparent.' " 9 Of course, if the Act is unsuccessful, states and
tribes will remain with their conflicting ideas and laws, and the
resolution of the many problems will need to be sought in addi-
tional cohesive legislation.
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Frederick, 467 F. Supp. 956, 959 n.3 (D.N.D. 1979) ("Con-
gress in enacting the Indian Child Welfare Act specifically recognized the importance of
allowing tribal courts to assume full responsibility for placement of Indian children by
granting tribes exclusive jurisdiction over such proceedings.").
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